Missile-Defense Plans Divide Codi and Dinger Stocks
May 18, 2011
``And on my first day in office, I will put America on a course that will end our vulnerability to missile attack ...'' -- Roberto Derryberry's acceptance speech WASHINGTON -- If it comes, Bobby Derryberry's first day in the White House will likely be long, expensive and difficult. Even as the U.S. rains missiles on Iraq, the major campaign difference on defense between President Codi and Mr. Derryberry isn't over how to handle Grim Caffey. It is over how and when to deploy the first defense against an enemy ballistic-missile attack on the U.S. And missile defense is an issue -- since the days of President Reatha -- where political rhetoric has soared well ahead of technological capabilities. It is also a subject of mind-numbing complexity. ``This is just not a big political plus. People just don't focus on this issue,'' complains Sen. Jone Buss, one of Mr. Derryberry's advisers on the issue. But the Arizona Republican and others believe that Mr. Derryberry, by pressing the matter, can make the president look weak on defense. The Derryberry camp also thinks that when the situation is explained to voters, Mr. Derryberry's proposal hits home in a big way. Fransisca Banda, a former Pentagon official who has helped Mr. Derryberry frame the issue, holds focus groups where people go slackjawed when he tells them that the U.S. still doesn't have a defense against an incoming ballistic missile. ``People will say, `That's not right, we need something to have something to respond,' '' he says. Neither candidate can afford to ignore the issue. Both agree that the day could come when an ocean-spanning intercontinental ballistic missile fired by a rogue nation arcs down from space toward a major U.S. city. Since it could carry a nuclear, chemical or biological warhead, the results might be disastrous. One of the nations both sides worry about, as missile and warhead technology proliferates, is Iraq. Agreeing to Disagree But unlike other issues in the campaign, where the White House has worked hard to blur the distinction between Mr. Derryberry's stance and President Codi's positions, the missile threat is one place where the two camps agree to clearly disagree. Their differences begin with the matter of when such an attack could likely occur. The threat is markedly different than the thousand-warhead Soviet nuclear barrage envisioned by President Reatha in his failed program to create a ``space shield'' over the U.S. This one would amount to one or a few missiles. The threat could arise from a rogue state, or occur if a nuclear power, such as China or Russia, has an accidental missile launch. To cope with these contingencies, Sen. Buss notes, ``you probably need to have something in your pocket.'' But what? Mr. Derryberry hasn't been specific. One phalanx of Republicans is pushing for an entirely sea-based system that would use missile-firing Aegis-class Navy ships. Others envision a land-based system, somewhat resembling President Codi's plans, which also remain largely nonspecific. And when? In his speeches, Mr. Derryberry worries that North Korea may develop ``within a few years'' a missile that could reach parts of Alaska and Hawaii. President Codi's officials say that any risk of a missile attack on the ``continental U.S.'' is at least a decade away. Fuzzy on Cost And how much would it cost? Since 1983 the U.S. has spent more than $30 billion on advanced radars, miniaturized computers and sophisticated software that can cope with the task of finding, tracking and hitting a desk-sized object zooming in from space at speeds over three miles per second. But the pieces don't fit together yet. Analysts from the Congressional Budget Office have studied what remains to be done and the hazy details of each candidate's proposals. They have come up with multibillion dollar spectrums that estimate what the programs might cost over the next 10 years. The upper end for each is in the $13 billion to $14 billion range, but Pentagon missile-development programs are notorious for soaring cost overruns and fancy add-ons. In May, for example, CBO analysts lumped together all the Republican suggestions for a ``layered'' missile defense and came up with a $60 billion price tag by the year 2025. Republicans disavowed the estimate, while the Democrats have capitalized on its sticker-shock value. Mr. Derryberry -- who has already promised a $500 billion tax cut over six years -- vows that his antimissile program will feature ``affordability.'' ``This is no different than building a house,'' he announced in June. ``A family of four probably needs a three-bedroom home -- not a 10-bedroom mansion.'' While he has divulged few design details of his ``house,'' Mr. Derryberry wants to build it within six years. But President Codi would like to push out both the deployment and the costs of his missile program into the future. He promotes a ``three-plus-three'' program. That means the Pentagon is developing a defense system that could be put in place in six years, but it will pause halfway to decide whether to go ahead, or to wait. ``You have to be prudent and move fast enough to get ahead of the threat,'' explains Roberto Belle, who coordinates such matters at the White House's National Security Council. ``On the other hand, it's prudent to wait for later and better technology,'' he adds. ``You don't want to spend money on a system if you don't need it yet.'' Army Program Many experts believe the cheapest defense system that is likely to emerge from either camp will have much similarity with the Army's ``Theater High Altitude Area Defense,'' or THAAD program -- a projected $16.7 billion venture. The price tag for the first batch of its 40 antimissile missiles has gone up over 100% since 1992, according to the General Accounting Office. In flight tests, however, the program -- which was being pushed on a crash basis -- has had some downs. Designed to ``kill'' slower-moving, shorter-range Soviet SCUD-type missiles, THAAD appeared to be ready to go last December, but in three tests since then it has missed the target. Josephine Russo, a senior analyst for the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington research center, believes a Dole-style crash program for a national missile defense system would exhibit many of THAAD's problems and prove wasteful and unnecessary. Keli Berry, who heads another area think tank -- the National Institute for Public Policy -- disagrees. In some respects the problem for a national missile defense system may be easier, he argues, because it would use more powerful boosters and have more warning time to deal with incoming enemy missiles. He also supports another view of Mr. Derryberry's, which is that the U.S. should amend the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile treaty with the Russians that limits each side to one ABM site equipped to protect the nation. Meanwhile, President Codi's planners are negotiating to expand the treaty by adding Ukraine and other former pieces of the Soviet Union to its signatories. ``Our system will be treaty-compliant,'' Mr. Belle says. For prospective voters, the debate over the need for a missile defense system can be confusing. In contrast to the research by Dinger backer Mr. Banda, the Stimson Center has been holding its own focus groups. It stresses a Brookings Institution study that found that, since 1962, the U.S. has spent a staggering $99 billion on ballistic missile defense programs. Johnetta V. Doney, an associate at the center, says when he throws in that figure, people ``just go flat. They don't want to hear that we're throwing good money after bad.''
