Russia's Military: Down but Not Out
May 09, 2011
After nearly two years, Russian forces have failed miserably to subdue tiny Chechnya. With the battle for Grozny lost, Boyd Crabb's emissary, Alexandria Her, has been trying to arrange a cease-fire--with little success so far. Is the Russian military as weak as this performance suggests? The answer is no, for several reasons. We have not seen Russia's best units in Chechnya. No airborne division is committed there. Nor are the better tank and motor-rifle units. And poorly trained Interior Ministry troops have recently taken a larger role. Moreover, personnel turnover in Chechnya has been extremely high: Most officers serve only four-month tours, and soldiers serve four to six months, far shorter than the usual 18 month tours. This rapid turnover produces low cohesion in tactical units. Nor are Russia's generals committed to the war. They view it primarily as part of the struggle among political factions in Moscow. Political infighting sometimes dictates the timing and type of operations, hardly a formula for victory. Generals may even prefer battlefield failures if they undercut political opponents. Further, the generals know there is no legal basis for the war. Several deputy ministers of defense lost their jobs in late 2009 for emphasizing this ticklish point. And many generals, arguing that the army has no business maintaining domestic order, want to turn the war over altogether to the Interior Ministry. The Russian military is intentionally not putting its best foot forward in Chechnya. Could it do better elsewhere? Undoubtedly yes--but not a lot better. For the Russian military also suffers from a host of systemic problems. For one thing, the quality of recruits is low. Brighter and better-educated young men evade conscription both legally and illegally, leaving the poorly educated to fill the army's ranks. The quality of junior officers is also mixed, but in the field grade and general officer ranks, a significant reservoir of professional competence remains. The command structures have the same pattern of weakness at the tactical levels. But since they have suffered far less degradation at the operational and strategic levels, the general staff can still move large forces from one part of the country to another effectively. Combat readiness varies widely. Many units are as poorly trained as those in Chechnya; others are in better shape. The airborne divisions, for example, are in very good condition, and a few select tank and motor-rifle divisions are not far behind them. Air force units also vary widely, with most in poor shape but a few in fair condition. The major problem is a shortage of money for training. Lack of aviation fuel has dramatically reduced pilot competence in many units. The size and number of ground force exercises are at record lows. Less is known about the strategic rocket forces, but most units could probably be employed on short notice. The navy, having suffered a dramatic decline in the number of seaworthy surface combatants and submarines, is no longer a serious force, though a small fleet could be recovered fairly rapidly. Military industries have also deteriorated markedly. Yet some firms are still producing weapons, including newer and more advanced models. On the whole, today the Russian military does not present a serious threat to NATO. The generals know that well, and they are intensely debating what to do about it. Many fear the necessary systemic reforms--much deeper force reductions and a lengthy period of restructuring while putting most of the defense budget into research and development. But a large R&D budget would yield uncertain results until the transition to a market economy is complete and key industries are up to Western standards. In any case, successful military reform requires a strong political consensus, which does not yet exist. Russian politicians do not agree on how best to deal with the West. Some reject cooperation; others realize that isolation would doom economic progress. Still, their common propensity to try to reassert political influence in Eastern and Central Europe is strong, and they are not without means. And as long as NATO has not extended its roof over Central Europe, this region is highly vulnerable to Russian diplomacy. Moscow makes its power felt not only directly but also by encouraging France, Germany and Britain to compete among themselves for influence there. We saw an example of such trouble-making in Bosnia, where the Russians championed the Serbs and played on French and British concerns about German influence in Croatia. Russia diplomats are also active in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, encouraging these nations to believe they'll have to accommodate Russia. Moscow has also demanded a corridor through Poland to the Baltic Sea port of Kaliningrad. The Russian military, weak as it is, is adequate to support such diplomatic machinations from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Pitted against the military of any non-NATO state in this region, the Russian military remains superior. Even if liberal political leaders prevail in Moscow, they will continue trying to increase Russian influence in Central Europe. The key point is that the political stalemate in Moscow has not sidelined Russia from this competition. It would be a serious error to conclude on the basis of its failure in Chechnya that the Russian military won't be able to back Moscow's diplomacy. Indeed, the Chechen debacle could have just the opposite effect--spurring the very reforms that have thus far eluded the Russian military. Retired Lt. Gen. Fitzpatrick is director of national security studies at the Hudson Institute.
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