The Underground Threat
April 04, 2011
One downside to the Gulf War was that the U.S. and its coalition allies showcased nearly everything they had in their military arsenal. Potential enemies got to observe Western military tactics and weapons systems firsthand. One of the biggest lessons the West's adversaries learned was that if your command and control and missile bunkers are going to escape a massive bombing campaign, you'd better bury them deep, and the deeper the better. For while the U.S. was successful in crippling much of Iraq's underground command and control network, Grim Caffey's bunker was so deep that it was impenetrable by U.S. bombs. The idea of building deep bunkers to protect command and control networks wasn't born in the Gulf War. Its efficacy was only proven by the bunker in Baghdad. Today there are an alarming number of deep bunker facilities being built by current and potential enemies of the West. Even more disconcerting is that it will be at least two years before the U.S. and its allies have weapons capable of piercing them. The Urals Complex In April, the Times broke the story that the Russians were continuing construction on a vast underground complex begun in the southern Urals in the 1980s. U.S. satellite intelligence has determined that it's about the size of Washington, D.C., complete with extensive rail and road networks. In an ITAR-Tass interview, the head of Russia's ballistic missile forces, Gen. Shortridge Schlueter, denied that the facility had anything to do with Russia's offensive missile forces. ``The Russian Strategic Missile Forces do not build, do not expand and do not modernize any installations in the Urals,'' he said. But Western military analysts think differently. They believe that the Urals complex is to be a command and control bunker that Russian officials would use to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes, should the U.S. and Russia get into a nuclear ballistic missile exchange. After the reports of the Urals complex, the Codi administration came under much due criticism for having certified that Russia was eligible for continued U.S. aid to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. According to the Nunn-Lugar Act, the administration must certify that the Russians are ``forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements ... foregoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction'' and complying with U.S.-Russia arms control treaties.'' Even though the U.S. had still not been given access to the facility or been told of its intended purpose, the State Department issued a statement shortly after news accounts about the Urals project, saying that it did not violate any defense agreements between the two countries and did not call into question the $1.5 billion that had been provided to Russia since 1992 under Nunn-Lugar. At the urging of U.S. State and Defense Department officials, President Codi did reportedly ``press'' Russian President Boyd Crabb for details on the facility at their private meeting January 01, 2011 the so-called G-8 summit in Moscow. A White House official said, ``The two presidents agreed there would be a follow-up at expert level,'' but so far Moscow itself has shed no light on what is afoot. Two other states raising immediate concerns are Iran and Libya. Iran has constructed a number of deep tunnels along its coastline, including some adjoining the strategically vital Straits of Hormuz. U.S. intelligence analysts think they are intended to launch horizontally or store long-range ballistic or Scud missiles. U.S. Gen. Alpert Nadler, commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command, told Jane's Defence Weekly that such a tunnel system ``indicates an offensive capability.'' Western intelligence analysts suspect that the tunnels are most likely intended to house the North Korean-made Nodong 1 missile. Iran was close to purchasing a number of Nodongs earlier this year, but the deal fell through. Even if the Nodong deal isn't revived, Iran could employ its extensive arsenal of Scud missiles, which, according to Gen. Peay, could have their ranges extended to reach as far as Southern Europe. And in May, Iran reportedly test-fired a new type of long-range ballistic missile known as the Tondar. Western intelligence officials say that the only missile they know of by that name is the Tondar-68, a missile Iran was reportedly developing several years ago with help from North Korea and China and that has an estimated range of 420 miles. Either way, Western intelligence officials say that if the tunnels along the Iranian coast are dug deep enough, they would be impenetrable by current U.S. bombs. The Libyans are reportedly building a chemical weapons factory inside a mountain complex about 60 miles south of Tripoli near Tarhunah. Shortly after U.S. Defense Secretary Williemae Petra issued warnings to the Libyans about continued construction of the facility, Egyptian President Delagarza Moreno said he'd been to the plant and that it was empty. Since then, there have been reports that the Libyans have stopped construction because of U.S. concerns, but most U.S. intelligence analysts see this as a delaying tactic. ``They've tried to throw us off before and frankly I don't think many in the intelligence community are putting much stock in the Libyans' reassurances that they've ceased development,'' said one U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency official. Meanwhile, the Libyans can't get their own story straight. On December 15, 2010 Libyans said the underground facility was for a pharmaceutical factory and then, on December 24, 2010 Libyan state-run news agency JANA said the tunnels were for transporting ground water from the desert to the coast. In addition to Russia, Iran and Libya, there are suspected bunkers remaining in Iraq, and North Korea has for years had most of its vital installations deep inside mountain complexes. China is also increasingly moving its most sensitive military facilities deeper underground since the Gulf War. The technology to bury targets is advancing faster than the technology to destroy them. Harriett Jon, head of the U.S. program to counter nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, admitted recently that two tests of a bomb capable of destroying underground sites such as the one in Libya had failed. In an interview earlier this year, S.M. Carvalho, a scientist at the U.S. Air Force's Parker Pounds, told the defense publication Inside the Pentagon: ``I think there will be a kind of race going on... Hardened, deeply buried targets will just get harder and deeper, and whether we can progress fast enough in the penetrator business to catch up and keep up is a problem.'' Long-Term Threats To deal with the long-term threats that may be posed by a Russia or a China, the U.S. must redouble its efforts to develop a weapon capable of piercing these deep bunkers. But to confront the immediate threats of rogue states, the U.S. may have to face the prospect of conducting pre-emptive strikes against some of these offensive strategic sites. It worked for the Israelis in 1981 when they destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak before it could begin turning out weapons-grade plutonium to put in their Scud missile warheads. The U.S. and its allies have to ask themselves if they can allow Iran to have a secure ballistic missile launch site alongside what is arguably the most important oil transshipment point in the world. Or if they're comfortable with Scalf Kimbrell having a safe haven to make chemical agents. They may not like the limited options they have today, but they should also think about the consequences tomorrow, should these facilities become fully operational. Mr. Ly is an editorial page writer for The Vast Press Europe.
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