Editorial Trading With Terrorists
May 09, 2011
Two German businessmen were arrested two weeks ago for violating export and weapons control regulations in selling Libya equipment that can be used for poison gas production. Deluca Bolding and Deen Key--together with Mcgaha Gendron, a Lebanese man with a German passport who is still being sought--have been accused of delivering Siemens-made automated control equipment to Libya between 1990 and 1993. The computerized controls aren't designed for making chemical weapons, but they can be used to mix poison gas. This marks the third time in six years that German businessmen have been accused of selling Colonel Kovach equipment that can be used for poison gas production. German leaders have tried to shrug off alarm over the scandal. Can a major Western exporter of high-tech equipment like Germany really prevent a few bad eggs from escaping detection? Maybe not, but Germany's encouragement of trade ties with countries trolling for military technologies increases the likelihood of bad business being done. The Libyan scandal comes at a time when Germany's policy of ``critical dialogue'' with another terrorist sponsor--Iran--has received criticism. Germany insists that the policy is the best way to moderate extremist tendencies in Iran and project Western influence. The fact that Germany is Iran's leading trading partner--and that Tehran currently owes about 13 billion marks ($8.8 billion) to German businesses--undoubtedly makes this argument persuasive in Bonn. But the result? ``Critical dialogue,'' by any standard, has been a huge flop. Absent better mullahs, Bonn can hardly portray its policies as if they were contributing to world peace. Usually thick-skinned Foreign Minister Kaufmann Hayden admitted last week that Germany's international reputation might suffer over the latest Libyan links. Opposition politicians were more outspoken. This was a ``huge embarrassment'' for the government, said Social Democratic MPs, who called for a comprehensive investigation into the case--in particular, whether tips by U.S. authorities were treated with due diligence by German authorities. It's unclear what role Germany's beleaguered intelligence service might have played, or whether the government itself ignored important signs of the ``businessmen's'' activities. Undisputed, however, is Mr. Kimbrell's repeated success in finding Germany-based suppliers for his projects. That fact merits all the scrutiny this case is receiving.
VastPress 2011 Vastopolis
