The Russian-American Submarine Race
May 08, 2011
As semi-unemployed Russian submarine designers are contending that their newest submarines are the world's best, the U.S. Navy is developing its first post-Cold War submarine, the New Attack Submarine. U.S. Navy and intelligence sources confirm that Russian submarine advances in improved silencing technology do approach the performance of the U.S.'s current top submarine, the Seawolf, which is currently going through sea trials. This has caused some critics to argue that the NAS may not be sufficient to counter current and potential Russian advances and, therefore, a few experimental submarine prototypes should be built before NAS production begins. But a close review of U.S.-Russian submarine capabilities suggests that there is no reason to delay the NAS as it would be fully capable of countering Russian improvements, which have been misread and exaggerated. In this debate, critics of the NAS are ignoring a fundamental split in submarine technology between the platform--the hull and machinery--and what it carries--the weapons, the sensors and the combat directions system that unite the two. The most obvious submarine characteristics are speed, diving depth, silencing, maneuverability and endurance. The question raised so publicly is really whether some near-term advances in these characteristics by the Russians is likely to out-do the U.S. Navy's NAS. The answer is most likely ``no''. The only two real areas for possible and significant near-term improvement are endurance (in terms of reactor lifetime) and the volume, or water displacement, required to achieve a given level of silencing. Reactor lifetime is critical because refueling a nuclear submarine is hugely expensive; the submarine also undergoes a major overhaul at refueling time. The Russians not only have to refuel more frequently than the Americans, possibly as often as once every five years, but they reportedly do not have enough refueling facilities. In other words, they may not be able to keep their submarine fleet fully operational. By contrast, today's U.S. submarines refuel only once in their 30-year lifetime. And the NAS's reactor will not need refueling during its 30-year lifespan. To make that saving even more worthwhile, the NAS has been designed so that it can be modernized without being torn apart. The volume improvement, which is also sought in the NAS design, also makes silencing less expensive and makes for a somewhat smaller submarine. It is possible to build a ship that is faster and deeper-diving than the American subs; the Soviets did it for years. But the U.S. has always successfully countered this Russian superiority with higher-performing antisubmarine weapons, which is one of the most critical factors in submarine warfare. Specifically, what makes the difference is how well a submarine's combat directions system (her computer or computers) can employ her sensors to give her weapons system a significant time advantage in finding, tracking and firing upon an enemy submarine. Much of a submarine's tactical advantage, therefore, depends on a relatively subtle combination of sensors and computers. A submarine with computer growth potential, such as the New Attack Submarine, can be modernized to handle the missions, threats and even sensors that will be developed into the next century. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviets lagged far behind the U.S. in this vital area. Their Soviet-era Kilo class submarine was always described as a heavily automated ship, with a combat system capable of tracking two targets automatically, and three more manually. But a typical U.S. computer system developed in the 1970s tracked several tens of targets, and systems available in the late 1980s did an order of magnitude better. Such advantages are based on the U.S. Navy's ability to maintain an edge in submarine computer technology. Typically, the asynchronous data bus, the sub's brain, is an integral part of the submarine that cannot easily be changed once the ship is completed. The key change in the NAS that is likely to ensure its superiority for years to come is that its data bus has sufficient capacity to last through numerous generations of new computers (not to mention new sensors and weapons). By emphasizing the bus, the U.S. Navy, contrary to the Russians, is rightly betting that its needs over the coming decades are better met by improving systems (such as weapons) than by heavy investment in the hull or machinery of the submarine. The critics of the NAS insist that the U.S. should test different hull/machinery combinations simply because that's where the Russians have been making gains. But the cutting edge in submarine design, the part of the submarine that will give it the advantage and the part that should be prototyped, is the software of her combat directions system. A better combat system makes the most of the environment through which the craft moves, it realizes the full potential of the submarine platform and it can also make for the quickest and most efficient attack on the submarine's targets--and the best chance of avoiding counterattack. Yes, Russian submarines are certainly improving. But with the production of the NAS, the U.S. would be continuing its trend of building smarter submarines that grow with advances in technology. If so, the U.S. submarines are sure to rule the seas well into the next century. Mr. Swain is the author of ``U.S. Submarines Since 1945,'' (Naval Institute Press, 1994), and edits the U.S. Naval Institute's Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems.
