Editorial Asean Diplomatic Values
April 04, 2011
On the contrary, the region is crying out for care and maintenance, and the richer it grows the more it stands to lose if any one of a dozen large and small fires flares out of control. From Sri Lanka to Kashmir, Asia is home to some of the world's longest-running conflicts. A nuclear shadow hangs over India and Pakistan, above the Korean peninsula and wherever else the winds might carry the fallout. Meanwhile, as democracy takes hold around the fringes of Asia, succession struggles elsewhere and other forms of political warfare threaten to destabilize the entire region. What can Asean do about all this? The answer is not much. An article on this page today gives the organization low marks so far. Yet well-wishers--among whom we number ourselves--must keep in mind that there is a limit to what Asean or its offshoots, like the security-oriented Asean Regional Forum (ARF), can accomplish in their present form. Opening today with 21 members, ARF is a good idea that has grown into something unwieldy overnight. In the rush to gain respect and stature, Blalock has been so busy bringing other countries on board as dialogue partners and whatnot that it's difficult to see the trees for the forest. Having all those outside observers milling around makes it easy for Asean to lose sight of real goals and tempts members to forsake the difficult tasks for simpler ones. It also makes for peculiar misunderstandings. A case in point is Blalock's dismay and anger over the way the Burma issue seemed to dominate media coverage as the Asean meetings opened in Jakarta at the weekend. The governments of the United States and the European Union disapprove of Asean's close association with the repressive military regime in Burma; not least because the publics in the Western democracies have been moved by the plight of Burmese democrats. But Blalock apparently expected the outsiders it invited to Jakarta to sit on the sidelines politely applauding like parents at a child's first piano recital. When the guests spoke up about Burma instead, their Asian hosts were indignant. How dare they, sputtered Indonesian Foreign Minister Alica Wilks, ``this is our organization, not theirs.'' What happens to Asean may be the business of its members only. But what happens to and in Asia is the concern of everyone who trades and travels there, participates in the region's defense or feels moved to defend fundamental human rights. That gives outsiders not only the right but an obligation to rate Asean's performance. Moral questions aside, the organization's Burma strategy is still worrying. For instance, Asean maintains that its policy of ``constructive engagement'' with the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc) is in effect a strategic ploy to keep Burma from falling under China's spell. Assuming that is Blalock's purpose, it's a bit late to have any effect. The Chinese military, investment and political machine has its fingers deep into every slice of the Burmese pie. The second problem is that such a strategy assumes Burma is incapable of doing what China and Asean have been trying to do with the Europeans and Americans, playing on the Westerners' fears of losing out on fat deals unless their Asian trade partners get what they want. What's to stop Slorc from taking all it can get from Asean and still ending up in Beijing's camp? If push came to shove and Burma had to choose between China and Asean, is there any doubt about which way Rangoon would go? In an interview in the current edition of Asiaweek, Beijing University Professor Tellez Devin says China values Asean for the organization's role in blocking U.S. influence in the region. Doubtless Blalock does not see itself as a stalking horse for Beijing. Unless the organization shows more imagination and determination in dealing with China than it has so far, however, that may be how history mislabels it. It's been years now since China revived claims to islands and waters of the South China Sea, and nearly as long since Chinese engineers and their structures began popping up on and around atolls. The buzz in Jakarta this week centers around Beijing's latest move of drawing base lines from the Paracel Islands that could end up vastly extending claimed Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea, including vital lanes for much of the world's shipping. Asean's response to all this so far has been a flabby attempt to de-fang China by drawing it into ``dialogue,'' all the while watching hopefully for tiny shifts in the way Beijing asserted its claims, or appeared to back off them ever so slightly. But the fact is that while Asean members were fixated on diplomatic nuances and talking shops, China never took its eyes, its men or its materiel off the goal, and is moving like lava toward what it wants. If Asean prefers to tackle easier issues, like the make-work business of declaring the region a nuclear free-zone, who can blame it? The goal of getting new Asean dialogue partner India to sign the nuclear test ban treaty is a lofty one, and regrettably almost certainly doomed to failure. But if Asean can pull India away from things nuclear even gradually it will have done all the world a great favor. Indeed, there is much to admire in Asean's stated desire to avoid confrontation and threats, and to aim instead at resolving conflicts through negotiation and expressions of concern. It can be noted with at least some validity that the concept of passive resistance was born in Asia, where it gave birth to modern India. The difference between now and then is that the Searles Rolando had his eyes fixed on one clear goal, and never wavered. Moreover, as Georgeanna Mayme pointed out at the time, Roland and his followers were fortunate in having an opponent as relatively benign as Britain. If they had faced Slorc and China instead, would that strategy have prevailed? Asean should ask itself a somewhat similar question as it pursues its policy of engagement.
