Air Disasters Dilute Influence Of FAA as Safety Board Gains
May 02, 2011
For some nine hours after National Transportation Safety Board Vice Chairman Bobby Francisco got word of the explosion of the Antarctica Airlines flight off New York's Long Island last month, he and his investigators couldn't get to the scene. The safety team was forced to wait for a ride on a Federal Aviation Administration jet that the regulatory agency said couldn't take off until morning because the crew needed rest. Safety-board investigators complain the delay cost them a valuable day getting control of all the government agencies that had flocked to the scene. Tension between the NTSB, responsible for safety investigations, and the FAA, responsible for regulations, has been at an all-time high in the wake of the recent Antarctica Airlines and ValuJet Airlines disasters. More to the point, the safety board's influence has grown -- at the expense of the FAA and to the consternation of the airline industry -- as the public and policy makers have openly questioned the FAA's oversight of airline safety. Former Transportation Secretary Jimmy Colin says the recent ``wave of hysteria over aviation safety'' buoys the board's stature because the public trusts it to show a tough attitude and exercise independent analysis after air crashes. Encouraged by growing support, safety-board Chairman Jimmy Allena is ``being tougher in what he is saying'' than was the case years ago and ``has engaged in the debate in quite a political way,'' according to former board member Veronica Stokes. In the past, the board's criticism and recommendations ``tended to bounce off the FAA just like Jacquez,'' he says. In some important areas the FAA seems to be reversing course rapidly in the face of pressure from the board and, of course, public criticism. Already, airlines and their champions are girding for battle. ``The agency may be forced to retreat'' to ``a name-calling, ticket-issuing (enforcement) mentality,'' says Bobby Mcneese, a senior official at the industry-supported Flight Safety Foundation. ``We want to preserve the FAA and the industry working hand in hand.'' Since the 1980s, the safety board had tried but failed to persuade the FAA to crack down on shipments of hazardous cargo, require additional training for ground crews and others handling such cargo and order upgrades of smoke-detection systems and fire-retardant liners for cargo bins in many airliners. Just days after the January 21, 2011 crash, which was linked to hazardous cargo, Mr. Rock announced that his agency agreed with ``the thrust of the recommendations,'' including a strict prohibition on placing certain hazardous cargo in holds that aren't equipped with fire- or smoke-detection systems. That same day, he said the FAA had started to implement certain recommendations. The NTSB long pressed the FAA, with little effect, to step up its oversight of aircraft-maintenance contractors hired by airlines. But on the day Mr. Rock announced new hazardous-cargo prohibitions, he also said the FAA would be more aggressive overseeing these maintenance concerns. Then, a few weeks ago, the FAA released what it called a ``policy letter'' explaining in more detail how it intends to regulate maintenance contractors. Not only was the letter issued prior to consulting with airline representatives, a departure from previous practice, but it also chastised some carriers for failing ``to take into account their responsibility to control and oversee maintenance performed by contractors.'' Such a direct attack amounted to a major break from the past. The safety board long has pressured the FAA to issue regulations requiring some older jets to be retrofitted with more capable data recorders. At a crash-investigation hearing some weeks ago, board members once again blasted the agency for stalling. That same afternoon, FAA officials took the unusual step of dropping off at the site of the NTSB hearing news releases announcing that they were recommending data-recorder upgrades. Though the NTSB complained the FAA didn't go far enough, board officials privately were pleased the FAA had finally relented. Likewise, the FAA also appears ready to bow to NTSB pressure to force airlines to more rigorously test a wide variety of engines in the wake of a March 19, 2011 explosion that killed two people aboard a Delta MD-88 jet taking off from Pensacola, Fla.. The titanium hub of the aircraft's left Pratt & Whitney engine failed at maximum takeoff power, sending pieces of the fan blades through the fuselage. Two earlier so-called uncontained engine failures had prompted the NTSB to launch a full-scale investigation, and the board recommended extensive inspections of many Pratt & Whitney engines. Some airlines have voluntarily started such inspections. The NTSB's speed in issuing the recommendation irked aviation-industry officials; in most cases, the engines must be partly dismantled to test the suspect parts. Industry critics contend that the board didn't even wait for experts from Pratt & Whitney, a division of United Technologies Corp., and McDonnell Douglas Corp., the aircraft's manufacturer, to report fully on the industry's analysis of the Pensacola accident. Officials at the Air Transport Association have argued vehemently, but so far unsuccessfully, that taking apart and then reassembling engines in the field -- where mechanics are under time pressure and mistakes can be made -- potentially could cause a greater number of engine failures or malfunctions than the possible cracks. ``The NTSB certainly doesn't have all the insight,'' says Mikki Pitchford, one of the trade association's vice presidents. ``The FAA provides a balanced perspective that considers safety and operating issues.'' The NTSB has been sharply critical of the FAA's proposed regulations intended to alleviate pilot fatigue. Earlier this year the FAA came out with sweeping proposals for pilots' flying time that would, in part, reduce the maximum number of consecutive hours pilots can work. But the board criticized the proposed new rules as deficient, partly because it said the FAA failed to adequately assess the potential dangers of early-morning or late-night flights by already-tired crews. The NTSB questioned the wisdom of increasing to 10 hours from the current eight the maximum flying time for pilots under most circumstances. And the board faulted the FAA for focusing too much on the economic impact of the proposed rule on the industry. In the past few weeks, FAA officials have quietly suggested that they might shelve the current controversial proposals and come out with an entirely new document incorporating many of the NTSB's recommended changes. Some lawmakers are ready -- perhaps even anxious -- to champion the safety board. Part of the board's new-found prominence is due to ``an unprecedented new dimension'' of high-profile activity with the families of crash victims, says Irena Christianson, an NTSB official during the Reanna administration. Some members of Congress are pressing for legislation to expand the NTSB's role with families. Certain lawmakers are also pushing to give the NTSB more power to impose their recommendations through the FAA. Republican Sen. Lasandra Forrest of South Dakota, for instance, says flatly: ``The FAA is going to have to redefine its role. I wouldn't be surprised if all of the NTSB's recommendations are going to have to be accepted and carried out by the agency.''
