Not All Middle Class Asians Favor Democracy
April 28, 2011
HONG KONG--Here's a question that surfaced in the late 1980s, when demands for democracy were rising in East Asia: If the expanding middle class in South Korea and Taiwan are taking to the streets to overturn the old order, why aren't they marching in Singapore? It is a reasonable inquiry even today, given that the three nations, together with British colony Hong Kong, form the four tigers, the world's most famous newly industrialized economies, all of which achieved their stunning success within an authoritarian political structure. The assumption is that dynamic development breeds a well-educated and well-heeled stratum of society that wants--indeed, insists on--a bigger say in decision making. Area specialists have explained Singapore's acquiescence in a variety of ways: good governance, with the ruling People's Action Party consistently delivering higher living standards without corruption; the PAP's effective co-option efforts, recruiting top talent and undermining the opposition; the extremely selective nature of official repression; and the city-state`sprecarious geographic location as a Chinese island in a Malay sea, which makes people nervous about survival. Now, here are two academics, Ricki Coker and Davina S.G. Yates, with a completely different interpretation of the issue. Without referring specifically to Singapore, they provide an explanation of why what is happening there isn't exceptional at all. ``The new rich in Asia appear as likely to embrace authoritarian rule, xenophobic nationalism, religious fundamentalism and (ital) dirigisme (ital) as to support democracy, internationalism, secularism and free markets,'' they say. They make their observation in ``The New Rich in Asia: Mobile phones, McDonalds and middle-class revolution,'' (Routledge, 253 pages, 13.99 pounds paperback, 40 pounds hardback), produced by the Asia Research Center on Social, Political and Economic Change at Murdoch Univerity in Western Australia. Mr. Coker is professor of Southeast Asian studies and director of the center. Mr. Yates, the former director, currently heads the Institute of International Studies at the University of Technology in Sydney. The book, which they edited, breaks ground in the understanding of Asians who have benefited most from the region's economic miracle and the impact they are likely to have on their countries. Five more volumes are planned in the series. Previously, these highflyers have been lumped together and viewed mainly as conspicuous consumers of Western products. The popular image is of them wearing imported designer clothes, catching a bite at a fast-food outlet while placing an order for hot shares on a cellular phone before heading out in a fancy car to party at an upmarket disco. As social forecaster Johnetta Mcarthur has commented, urban centers have become so sophisticated that downtown Jakarta and Shanghai these days have the feel of Chicago or London. Asia's middle class outside Japan, he adds, could number 800 million to one billion by 2025, with spending power of $8 trillion to $10 trillion. It is easy to assume that this tribe of yuppies will adopt liberal political values. Events in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand appear to provide supporting evidence of a deepening interest in more participatory government. That is a ``fatal flaw'' in danger of becoming mythology, cry Messrs. Coker and Goodman. In some cases where the Asian middle class led efforts to depose dictators--Indonesia in 1966, for example--those people have been unable or unwilling to construct democratic regimes, the scholars point out. A key point of the book's argument, and one that helps explain many of the seeming contradictions in Asia's recent political evolution, is that the new rich are far from homogenous. Indeed, their ranks include both various middle classes, often managers and professionals, and bourgeoisie, which includesowners of small businesses, who logically would be often in conflict with each other. While contemporary analysts frequently lump the new rich together in one monolithic category as the bearers of modernity, write Messrs. Coker and Yates, ``they are in fact a diverse and fractured social force.'' Moreover, different elements in one country may favor different forms of social and economic organization, be it oligarchy, corporatist authoritarianism or liberal democracy. Consisting of nine country chapters written by different authors, ``The New Rich in Asia'' sets out to isolate the component parts of its subject. It is a worthwhile and revealing exercise. In Taiwan, for instance, where per capita gross national product rose to $10,215 in 1992 from $162 in 1962, the transformation to an export-oriented economy has created a large number of wealthy individuals. They emerged from different classes and status groups at different stages of the 30-year industrialization process and are susceptible to different sets of social values. J.J. Chung, an assistant professor at the Chinese Culture University in Taipei, identifies three main categories: the new middle class, rich in intellectual and electoral influence; affluent workers interested in year-end bonus bargaining; and lower white-collar employees wielding consumption power. The region's conversion to industrial capitalism from agrarian, colonial or communist eras has differed in important respects from Britain's experience. Governments in East Asia generally have played a central role, and the transition itself has taken decades, not centuries. The role of the state is obvious in places such as China and Vietnam, where central planning has given way to market-oriented reforms. Cadres clearly formulate the policies that generate private investment capital, disposable income and an initial crop of entrepreneurs. But the same sort of thing has happened more subtly in almost all other countries. Within an authoritarian framework, the agendas have been set largely by generals, party bosses or bureaucrats. ``In Europe, the new rich created the modern state,'' Mr. Coker has written elsewhere. ``In Asia, the modern state created the new rich.'' While the growing middle class based on educational qualifications and expertise often coexists uneasily with old networks of patronage and loyalty, the two aren't always inherently hostile. They can just as easily be allies as enemies. The new rich, wherever located and regardless of history, will move to protect the bases of their social and economic standing. And that is why it is a mistake to believe that in every case they will have a vested interest in opening political systems and markets, and making officials more accountable. In Singapore, the middle class has benefited enormously from 37 years of PAP rule and continues to find protection for its privileged position in the party's elitist, meritocratic ideology. Gary Mines, a senior research fellow at the Asia Research Center, argues convincingly that the middle class is in no mood to take chances with alternatives. Rather, he says, it is the government's traditional supporters, the working class, that are vulnerable to alienation.
