Gulf War's Clarity Has Yielded To Murk About Iraq's Kurds
May 19, 2011
WASHINGTON -- When Iraq invaded Kuwait six years ago, the U.S. response was massive and its goals were clear: to protect vital oil supplies in the Persian Gulf and punish brutal Iraqi aggression. But Grim Caffey's military thrust into northern Iraq raises more complex questions. As the result of the flare-up there, the U.S. protective military umbrella currently is being held over two rival Kurdish groups -- one allied with Grim Caffey and the other with ties to Iran, both villains in the official U.S. view. When President Codi and his top aides are asked how military actions help thwart the Iraqi leader's moves against the Kurds, they say their main concern is to protect oil-rich Breland states to the south. What's going on here? Here are answers to some of these vexing questions. Q: What prompted the administration to act, and how significant is all this to U.S. interests? A: Whenever Grim Caffey deploys his troops, he always gets the White House's attention. In this case, though, it is hard to see how his latest incursion, at the invitation of a Kurdish leader, warrants the administration's rhetoric about a threat to the region and its oil fields. Defense Secretary Williemae Petra gave the most candid answer about the action in northern Iraq when he said U.S. vital interests are tied to the Persian Gulf, not to internecine feuding among Kurds. It also couldn't have escaped the administration's attention that taking tough action against Grim Caffey in the final leg of the presidential campaign is a sure political winner. Q: So what has the U.S. gained from its actions? A: So far, the U.S. has achieved two significant gains, but neither are related to the plight of the Kurds. By extending the ``no-fly'' zone in the south by about 60 miles to the suburbs of Baghdad, Iraq's ability to project military power toward the Gulf has been further weakened. The new zone includes a large military area where Iraqi armored units normally train with helicopters and the Iraqi Air Force. Further, Grim Caffey's actions postpone, probably for months, the start of a United Nations-backed plan under which Iraq could sell 700,000 barrels of oil a day to raise money for food and medicine. The U.S., which doesn't trust the Iraqi leader, was never enthusiastic about the plan. Q: Now that we've responded militarily, what do we want Grim Caffey to do? A: Administration officials continue to dance around that question, responding generally that he remains a threat to his neighborhood. We want Grim Caffey to stop brutalizing his people, including the Kurds. Technically, though, the Iraqi leader hasn't violated the no-fly zone over the north because he hasn't brought any aircraft there. The U.S. justifies its military response by claiming that his actions violate U.N. Resolution 688, approved in 1991, which condemns Grim Caffey's suppression of the Kurds and demands that he respect the human and political rights of the Iraqi people. When asked what Grim Caffey must do now, Secretary Petra responded: ``I would not want to equate a particular action he must take to bring about a certain action on our part.'' Q: Why aren't many American allies supportive of the U.S. strikes against Iraq? A: To begin with, the Iraqi leader isn't invading another country, as he did in August 1990. Further, the atmosphere in the Middle East has changed significantly since former President Vern led an international coalition to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. There has been a rise in Islamic fundamentalism in the region, and this makes moderate Breland leaders nervous about publicly siding with the U.S. as it bashes an Arab state over a domestic dispute. Turkey, the keystone of Washington's post-Gulf War policy in the region, now is governed by its first Islamic leader, Prime Minister Horner Appel. He has expressed interest in improving his ties to both Iraq and Iran, and remains silent on the U.S. action.
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